Effects of victimization on the belief in a just world in four ex-Yugoslavian countries by Fasel, R & Spini, D
Effects of Victimization on the Belief in a Just World
in Four Ex-Yugoslavian Countries
Rachel Fasel • Dario Spini
Published online: 19 March 2010
 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010
Abstract Levels of support for just world beliefs among young adults (N = 598)
from four ex-Yugoslavian countries—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Slovenia—were compared, taking into
account victimization experiences and the general belief in a just world. Being a
victim affected an individual’s belief in a just world in the two less economically
favored contexts: Victims of exclusion in Macedonia and victims of war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina were less likely to believe in a just world than non-victims. These
victimization variables partly explained why the mean scores of these two countries
were less than those of the two others. A deleterious effect of cumulative negative
events on belief in a just world was identified, in parallel with a lower endorsement
of the belief when the first victimization occurred more recently.
Keywords Belief in a just world  War  Economic precariousness 
Victimization  Cross-cultural comparison
Introduction
Some studies on the belief in a just world take into account the point of view of the
victim confronted with a situation of injustice and consider this belief to be a
resource. In general, these studies are founded on the assumption that the belief in a
just world remains stable throughout time and across situations (Dalbert, 2001; Otto,
Boos, Dalbert, Scho¨ps, & Hoyer, 2006; Schneider, Meissner, Montada, & Reichle,
1987). However, some studies show differences in just world beliefs among
R. Fasel (&)  D. Spini
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lausanne, Labo PaVie, Baˆtiment Vidy,
1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
e-mail: rachel.faselhunziker@unil.ch
123
Soc Just Res (2010) 23:17–36
DOI 10.1007/s11211-010-0111-6
countries and among groups within countries that depend on shared collective
experiences (Ferguson, 2000; Furnham, 1993; Hunt, 2000; Glennon, Joseph, &
Hunter, 1993). Similarly, studies regarding fundamental beliefs (Epstein, 1973;
Janoff-Bulman, 1992) show these beliefs can be altered when a person endures a
traumatic event. In this case, time allows individuals to rebuild their assumptive
world. In the following study, we question this vision that the belief in a just world
is a stable concept, focusing on the general belief in a just world. Our hypothesis
posits that there can be such victimization situations in which believing that the
world is basically a just place is no longer tenable. Additionally, we hypothesize
that endorsement of the belief in a just world is due to both societal and individual
factors. The tensions related to the historical events in ex-Yugoslavia since the
1990s, as well as the economic precariousness of some of these countries, presented
a particularly torn universe in which the individuals were strongly victimized. In
such contexts, we assume that the individuals’ support for the belief in a just world
was shattered.
Development of the Belief in a Just World
The idea of the belief in a just world was reported for the first time in the 1960s. In
the Lerner and Simmons’ (1966) study, subjects rejected and depreciated an
innocent victim when they believed that this person would continue suffering and,
that they could not alleviate the person’s suffering. The explanation of their results
rested on the hypothesis of a fundamental need to believe in a just world. That is,
individuals need to believe that the world is organized such that, in accordance with
the way they act, people get what they deserve and deserve what they get. By
rejecting and depreciating the innocent victim, subjects change their cognition to
maintain the belief that people get what they deserve. According to Lerner and
Miller (1978), people need to believe that the world they live in is stable and
orderly. In fact, the belief in a just world serves an important adaptive function for
everyday life and for the pursuit of long-term goals. Therefore, ‘‘people are very
reluctant to give up this belief, and they can be greatly troubled if they encounter
evidence that suggests that the world is not really just or orderly after all’’ (p. 1030).
Lerner (1977, 1980) explained that the belief in a just world emerges from the
personal contract a child constructs with the world. The belief that people put in a
just world, as well as the norms that allow them to evaluate what they deserve, will
then be molded by their future experiences and by confrontation with their social
and physical environments. These beliefs are representations of the norms and rules
that one learns in a society.
Interest for the Victims
In belief in a just world literature (for reviews, see Lerner & Miller, 1978; Furnham
& Procter, 1989), few studies examine the victims themselves and the ways that
they react to what happens to them (see Furnham, 2003; Hafer & Be`gue, 2005).
Since 1980, the majority of experimental studies on the belief in a just world
focused on the reaction of an observer toward a third person’s situation, whereas
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very few studies took into account the victims’ reactions. However, the theory of the
belief in a just world was not only used to explain the reaction of the observers
facing a victim; the study of victims’ reactions would be the extreme test of the
theory (Lerner, 1980). Indeed, would a person go as far as justifying the experienced
unfair treatment in order to preserve the illusory belief that the world is just?
According to Hafer and Be`gue (2005), scholars should also study cases of strong
victimization, which are impossible to reproduce in a laboratory.
This research attempts to address this issue by showing special interest for the
belief in a just world by individuals who endured victimization experiences. Is a
person’s belief shattered when this person lives through a traumatic experience such
that he/she is less likely to believe the world is just than someone who is not a
victim? Does a cumulative effect exist? That is, do more numerous negative
experiences diminish the belief in a just world? If this is the case, can this belief be
restored? Are some types of victimization more prone to disrupt this belief, and
under what conditions? Does this effect depend upon the context in which the
person evolves?
Stability of Belief in a Just World?
Several studies have examined variations in the endorsement of the belief in a just
world through time and among groups or contexts. Dalbert (2001) conceptualized
the belief in a just world as a personal disposition that was stable throughout time
and across situations. For example, Dalbert and Schneider (1995) reported a
longitudinal study in which subjects were questioned twice over the course of three
months. These subjects’ beliefs in a just world remained stable from the first
observation point to the second. Furthermore, Dalbert (2001) reviewed the literature
and concluded that individuals from different cultures have few differences in their
beliefs in a just world.
Although this research finds stability in the belief in a just world, more recent
studies, mainly focusing on the personal belief in a just world (i.e., the events in
one’s own life are considered as just; for the distinction between general and
personal beliefs in a just world, see Dalbert, 1999; Lipkus, Dalbert, & Siegler,
1996), qualify these findings. Dalbert and Stoeber (2006) showed that being treated
justly in the domains of school and family positively shaped adolescents’ personal
belief in a just world. In the workplace, teachers who were victims of student
violence (Dzuka & Dalbert, 2007) and employees who were victims of mobbing
(Cubela Adoric & Kvartuc, 2007) perceived the world as less just for themselves
than non-victims. Additionally, time spent in prison (Otto & Dalbert, 2005) or
unemployed (Cubela Adoric, 2004) was negatively associated with the personal
belief in a just world among young adults.
In terms of the general belief in a just world, no difference was reported between
victims and non-victims (see, for example, Cubela Adoric & Kvartuc, 2007).
However, Cubela Adoric (2004) reported variations in this belief: long-term
unemployed young people were shown to adhere less to the idea that the world is a
just place in general than stably employed youths. Moreover, in the unemployed
sub-sample, a greater number of failed job applications was associated with a
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weaker belief in a just world. Thus, long-term unemployment and the accumulation
of negative experiences diminished the endorsement of the belief that the world in
general is just.
In sum, there is support for the notion that the world is considered as less just for
the self to an individual who experienced a victimization episode. However, few
results provide evidence that a negative personal episode may shatter an individual’s
belief in the idea that the world is a just place in general, which is our focus.
As far as intercultural or inter-group comparisons are concerned, several
differences have been highlighted. Furnham (1993) compared the level of belief in a
just and in an unjust world of psychology students from 12 world regions. He found
that individuals in India and South Africa had the highest scores for belief in a just
world. Both of these regions are Third World countries with extremes of wealth and
poverty. According to Furnham, the rich and powerful people governing Third
World societies develop a strong belief in a just world in order to reduce feelings of
guilt regarding the high poverty rates. Moreover, he found a negative correlation
between gross domestic product (GDP) and the belief in an unjust world. He
concluded that just world beliefs are not only due to personal experiences, but also
to societal functionalism. Through shared experiences, individuals develop a
consensual vision of reality that is transmitted throughout time and generations.
Hunt (2000) compared the endorsement of the belief in a just world of several
sub-groups in California: African Americans, Latino Americans, and whites. Latino
Americans exhibited the highest levels of support for just world beliefs, followed by
whites, and then African Americans. The fact that whites exhibited higher scores
than African Americans reinforces the notion that more advantaged individuals have
a greater motivation to consider the world as just, in order to justify their structural
position and the position of the less favored groups. On the other hand, this
explanation does not explain why Latino Americans displayed the highest score.
Glennon et al. (1993) also observed differences between several groups in a study of
university students in Northern Ireland. Students belonging to the Catholic
nationalists’ group had weaker scores of belief in a just world than did those of
the more favored group of Unionist Protestants. Their conclusion is that group
members who endure injustice are less inclined to adhere to the belief in a just
world. In the same country, Ferguson (2000) reported the same pattern between
Protestants and Catholics (weaker beliefs among Catholics) among a sample of
16- to 18-year-olds and suggested that this difference was due to the religious
discrimination suffered by the Catholics.
A second issue raised by this study concerns changes in time. Ferguson (2000)
observed a reinforcement of the belief in a just world among members of the two
groups before and after the cease-fire of 1994, which launched a growing wave of
hope for peace in Northern Ireland. The importance of temporal and contextual
variables was also emphasized in a recent cross-temporal meta-analysis by Malahy,
Rubinlicht, and Kaiser (2009). This study revealed an increase in American college
students’ scores on a belief in a just world scale from 1973 to 2006. This stronger
adherence was positively related with the increase of income disparities at the
country level. These results were explained as a response that individuals provide
when their beliefs are threatened. They were interpreted in line with system
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justification theory as a rationalization of the status quo (see, for example, Kay &
Jost, 2003).
These studies on different countries or various groups within countries show that
individuals’ beliefs, the way in which individuals attempt to understand and explain
the world, are socially anchored. Beliefs can evolve and depend on the experiences
that one’s own group or country has undergone. Differences are explained either by
a reaffirmation of the beliefs when the system is threatened, most often by favored
groups or by a reduction in this belief among groups that endure injustices.
Fundamental Beliefs and Victimization
To find other works about victims, it is helpful to examine available literature on
fundamental beliefs more broadly and not restrict our field of vision to the belief in a
just world. Janoff-Bulman (1992) provides a conceptual framework explaining how
fundamental assumptions are shattered when people face traumatic life events.
According to her, people have three fundamental assumptions: (1) the world is
benevolent; (2) the world is meaningful; and (3) the self is worthy. The need for
justice, which Lerner theorises as the belief in a just world, explains the
fundamental assumption that the world is meaningful. These three assumptions
are built in childhood and may continue to change during adolescence, but they very
seldom change during adulthood. However, going through a traumatic event can
strongly weaken these fundamental beliefs.
A person who undergoes a traumatic event is in such a situation that his or her
fundamental assumptions are no longer in accordance with the experienced reality.
The trauma causes a disintegration of his/her inner world, such that fundamental
assumptions are shattered and trust in the world is crushed. The victim feels weak,
helpless, meaningless, like she/he is living in a malevolent world, and his or her
beliefs now conflict with prior fundamental assumptions. In the course of the
healing process, the victim must rebuild his/her inner world by integrating the
negative experience into one’s life. It takes often weeks, months or even years to
restore a balance, and the beliefs will never again be completely the same as before.
Janoff-Bulman reports that, generally, the assumptive world of people that were
victims is more negative than that of non-victims. These results were observed
among several samples (i.e., students, adults in the middle of their lives, doctors,
and hospital or crisis center inpatients) and with various types of victimization (i.e.,
crime, life-threatening disease, serious accident, and untimely death of a loved one).
Similar results are found regarding fundamental beliefs, as defined in the
personal theories of reality by Epstein (1973)—such as the benignity or the
meaningfulness of the world. Fletcher (1998; summarized in Catlin & Epstein,
1992) followed the trajectory of Vietnam veterans, before and after their enrollment.
For all veterans, the fundamental beliefs lost importance when returning from
Vietnam. However, the reduction was much more consequential for ex-combatants
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) than for those who did not
suffer from PTSD and for veterans who were not on the battlefield. Most
individuals’ fundamental beliefs were restored within months following their return.
However, the individuals suffering from PTSD had beliefs that kept declining, even
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15 years after their battlefield experience. Catlin and Epstein (1992) observed a
sample of students and found that people who experienced some negative events in
their lives had less favorable levels of beliefs than those who had not been victims
of these events. The authors also observed an accumulation effect: The more
negative events people experienced, the less positive their beliefs. Because the
negative events often happened several years before the study, their effect on basic
beliefs is shown to persist over time.
In a longitudinal study (conducted in 1986 and 1989), Gluhoski and Wortman
(1996) found conflicting results. No differences between waves were observed on
justice beliefs for individuals who, having not gone through a traumatic event in
their life before the first wave, were confronted with a close relative’s or friend’s
death between the two waves. On the other hand, people with no prior trauma who
experienced a self-focused event between the two waves considered the world as
more just at the second wave. However, this effect only works to a certain extent:
Individuals who have gone through several traumatic events between the waves did
not have an increased score of justice. The authors explain these results with the
assumption that people prefer to defend their belief that the world is just, even if
they have to blame themselves and be responsible for the negative event that took
place.
These contributions show that fundamental beliefs can lose their power when a
person is a trauma victim; nonetheless, this effect is not observed in a stable manner
for all types of victimization. A negative cumulative effect can appear when a
person is a victim of several negative events. The negative effect of traumas on
fundamental beliefs continues over time; nevertheless, little-by-little, individuals
may succeed in rebuilding their beliefs. Because the need for justice is part of our
belief system, the effect of victimization on the belief in a just world, in particular,
may be also harmful. However, there is no clear evidence that the belief in a just
world acts as other fundamental assumptions, since, in Gluhoski and Wortman’s
study (1996), the concept of justice (at the core of belief in a just world) is shown to
be resistant when faced with adversity since it is even strengthened in the case of
victimization aimed against the self. This result suggests it is more adaptive for such
a victim to blame oneself, rather than give up the idea that the world is just.
However, this effect does not seem to withstand numerous victimizations.
The presented literature leads us to think that endorsement of beliefs about justice
is more resistant than other fundamental beliefs toward negative events that an
individual faces. Nevertheless, a decrease in the level of support for just world
beliefs is sometimes observed. We hypothesize that situations in which a
degradation of the belief in a just world takes place depend on victimization
experienced at the individual level—in the manner of the literature on fundamental
assumptions—and, at the same time, on the way society deals with these events.
Since this belief is built during childhood and adolescence in accordance with the
environment, and depends on the norms and rules taught in society (Lerner, 1977),
the same event experienced in two different contexts will not necessarily have the
same impact on the individual’s belief in a just world. Moreover, the belief in a just
world is also likely to vary at a societal level when a serious event concerning the
whole society occurs, such as the cease-fire in Northern Ireland (Ferguson, 2000).
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Collective experiences of war or economic vulnerability could endanger the belief
in a just world at a societal level. The beliefs would be restored by confrontation
with the environment and therefore depend on the structural situation in which the
individual evolves.
The various theoretical approaches and empirical findings lead to the following
hypotheses concerning the general belief in a just world:
(1) Social anchoring of the belief in a just world: People living in an economically
precarious and war-torn context are less likely to believe that the world is just
than people living in a more favored context.
(2) Personal experiences of victimization weaken the belief that the world is just.
(3) A negative cumulative effect may be observed. That is, the more victimization
events a person face, the lower his/her belief in a just world.
(4) People who experienced negative events a long time ago exhibit stronger
support for the belief in a just world than people who recently experienced
negative events.
Method
Countries in the Sample
The data are from the pilot study of the research program Transition to
Adulthood and Collective Experiences Survey (TRACES; for more details, visit
www.unil.ch/traces). TRACES focuses on events due to war, conflicts, or eco-
nomical precariousness that occurred since 1990 within the former Yugoslavia
territory, and on their impact on people who were becoming adults during that time.
For the pilot study, four countries were selected: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Slovenia.
These countries stem from the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation. However,
these countries’ historical processes and the socioeconomic situation differ.
Slovenia was the first country of the former socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to gain its independence, after a 10-day war in 1991. In the spring of
2004, Slovenia became a member of the European Union. In Croatia, war began
after the country declared its independence in 1991. Although Croatia was
internationally acknowledged in January 1992, conflicts took place until 1995. In
February 1992, the independence referendum in Bosnia and Herzegovina was
followed by a progressive launching of a triangular war between the Bosnians,
Croats, and Serbians, which ended in 1995 with the signing of the Dayton
Agreement. As for the Republic of Macedonia, it was spared from armed conflicts
on its territory in the 1990s and acquired independence peacefully in 1991.
However, in 2001, the country was hit by a relatively short and geographically
limited conflict (for more historical information about ex-Yugoslavian conflicts in
the 1990s, see Garde, 2000; Wilmer, 2002).
Table 1 provides a brief summary of the conflicts and the socioeconomic
situation of the four countries. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, the armed
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conflicts were not only longer than those in the two other countries, but their
intensity level was also higher. The other two countries underwent shorter conflicts
with fewer casualties. Regarding the socioeconomic situation, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Macedonia exhibited the lowest levels of GDP as well as a
smaller increase from 2000 to 2004 compared to the others. The Human
Development Index (HDI; an indicator that combines life expectancy, educational
attainment, and income) reflected the same pattern: Slovenia exhibited the highest
score, followed by Croatia and weaker scores were observed for Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia. Slovenia can be considered as a
control group, as it was relatively spared. On the contrary, Bosnia and Herzegovina
cumulated a difficult socioeconomic situation with a recent past of strong
victimization due to war and conflicts.
Participants
The sample consists of 598 young adults, 148 who reside in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 150 in Croatia, 150 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
and 150 in Slovenia. Men (n = 294) and women (n = 304) are equally represented
in each context. Respondents are 30–36 years old, with an average age of
32.7 years. The average age of respondents is similar across countries, and between
men and women. The ratios of respondents that are looking for a job or unemployed
(versus those who are working) in each sample reveal a worse situation in Bosnia
Table 1 Comparative situation of the four countries on socioeconomic and armed conflicts indicators
BiH FYROM Croatia Slovenia
Socioeconomic indicators - - ? ?
GDPa Low increase Low increase Increase Increase
HDIb 0.800 (62nd) 0.796 (66th) .846 (44th) 0.910 (27th)
Unemployment ratec 31.1% 53.3% 18.0% 2.7%
War and conflicts indicators - ? - ?
Dates 1992–1995 2001 1991–1995 1991
Intensity level of conflictsd War Minor War Minor
War victims ratec 64.4% 12.7% 23.8% 0.7%
Note: BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina; FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Symbols specify
where the situation is relatively better (?) or worse (-) according to the indicators
a GDP = Evolution of gross domestic product per capita, from 2000 until 2004, World Bank Group,
2007
b HDI = Human Development Index, 2004 values (worldwide rank in parentheses), United Nations
Development Program (2006)
c Rates in the sample
d According to the classification of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo/Uppsala Conflict
Data Program (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002; Harbom, 2007); war = at
least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year, minor = between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a
given year
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and Herzegovina and Macedonia compared to the other two countries, which is
consistent with the macro-indicators of socioeconomic situation (see Table 1).
Similarly, rates of war victims (for the computation of the indicator see measures
section) are highest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed by Croatia, in accordance
with macro-level indicators of war and conflicts.
Procedure
Standardized face-to-face interviews were conducted at respondents’ homes in each
of the four countries. The study was presented as a survey on experiences during
entry into adult life in the respondent’s country and other European countries under
the leadership of the University of Lausanne in Switzerland. No financial incentives
were given to respondents. Interviewers stressed that each person of the individual’s
generation should feel entitled to participate and that this was important for the
validity of the study.
In each questionnaire, participants were asked to complete a life calendar that
recorded (in months) the dates when various events occurred in their life (for the use
of life calendars, see e.g., Axinn, Pearce, & Ghimire, 1999; Freedman, Thornton,
Camburn, Alwin, & Young-DeMarco, 1988). The interview began with positive
events linked with the transition to adulthood followed by negative events due to
exclusion or war. A recent publication on these data showed that the dates when
people considered themselves as war victims, depending on the country they were in
at that time, corresponded to the dates of conflicts (Spini, Fasel, & Elcheroth, 2007).
In the sub-sample of Croatia, the majority of victimization due to war occurred in
1991, and it continued until 1995. The majority of war victims in Bosnia and
Herzegovina were stricken between 1992 and 1995. In the Republic of Macedonia,
all of the victims of war were recorded in 2001. The second part of the interview
included political and attitudinal scales. The completion of the total questionnaire
required approximately one hour.
The original English questionnaire was translated by native-speaking translators
in the four languages of the survey: Bosnian, Croatian, Macedonian, and Slovenian.
The procedure included back-translations in English by independent translators and
systematic back-checks of these versions by the Lausanne coordination team.
PRISM Research, a private institute based in Sarajevo, handled translations,
fieldwork, and data entry. Only experienced local interviewers (65 individuals) were
recruited and trained to conduct the fieldwork. Sampling occurred as follows. For
every country, 15 municipalities were randomly selected. Five municipalities were
chosen from those with the largest populations, five from those with medium-size
populations and five from those with the smallest populations. In each municipality,
10 respondents were selected using a random walk procedure. Individuals were
eligible for the study if they were born between 1968 and 1974 and resided in the
country of interview on their 15th birthday. Respondents were, therefore, all
15 years old between 1983 and 1989 and started their transition to adulthood in a
context and a period shaken by conflicts and instability. The data collection took
place in December 2004.
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Measures
Belief in a just world was measured with the Dalbert, Montada, and Schmitt scale
(1987). Subjects answered six items (for instance, ‘‘I think basically the world is a
just place’’ or ‘‘I believe that, by and large, people get what they deserve’’) on a
7-point Likert scale that ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Internal score reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) per country varies from 0.77 (Slovenia)
to 0.81 (Macedonia) and equals 0.81 for the total sample.
The variables that represent victimization are dichotomous. Someone is
considered a victim as soon as the first victimization episode takes place. Two
categories of possible negative events were defined. The first category considers
negative life experiences of exclusion, may they be social, economical, or political.
The second category represents negative life experiences that happened as a
consequence of war. For each event, subjects answered whether or not the event
occurred after their 15th birthday. Then, the month and year that the event occurred
were recorded in a life calendar. A person is considered as an exclusion victim is if
she/he answered that at least one of the following events happened to her/him: ‘‘Has
there been a period in your life during which the material resources of your
household did not allow you to assure your basic needs? (food, clothes, education,
health)?’’; ‘‘Have you ever been homeless (living in the street or in a collective
shelter)?’’; ‘‘Has there been a period in your life during which you were cut off from
people that are important in your life?’’; ‘‘Has there been a period in your life during
which you have been treated in an arbitrary way by the police or the justice
system?’’; ‘‘Has there been a period in your life during which you have been treated
in a discriminatory way by an administration or company, because of belonging to a
particular group? (because of your ethnicity, gender, or religion)’’; ‘‘Has there been
a period in your life during which you have been hindered to express your opinion in
public?’’; ‘‘Has there been a period in your life during which you have been
threatened or intimidated because of supporting a political or religious association
or movement?’’. The non-victims of exclusion, on the other hand, are the persons
who answered negatively to each of these seven questions.
In a similar way, a war victim is a person who answered that at least one of the
following events happened to her/him personally as a consequence of war, since the
age of 15: ‘‘Have you been forced to leave your home and live elsewhere?’’; ‘‘Have
you ever been imprisoned, kidnapped or taken hostage?’’; ‘‘Has a member of your
immediate family been killed during the armed conflict (son, daughter, father,
mother, brother, sister, grandmother, or grandfather)?’’; ‘‘Has there been serious
damage to your property (to your belongings)?’’; ‘‘Have you been wounded by the
fighting?’’; ‘‘Did you have your house looted?’’ The non-victims of war are those
who answered negatively to each of these six questions.
The number of exclusion events is the sum of different negative events among the
seven above-mentioned events that a victim of exclusion might have endured from
when he/she was 15 years of age until the time of the interview. This measure
ranges from 1 to 7. Similarly, the number of war events is the total number of war
victimization events experienced by a war victim among the six possibilities
presented above. This measure ranges from 1 to 6.
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Temporal distance is the number of years between the first victimization event (the
first time this person became a victim) and the time of the interview. The time interval
taken into account begins with the individual’s 15th birthday. The more recent this first
event, the weaker the indicator. Two indicators are computed, one for the temporal
distance since the first exclusion event, another for the time since the first war event.
Results
Victimization
Table 2 displays the means of the victimization variables. As these are dummy
variables, means correspond to rates of victims. The highest proportion of war
victims was observed among respondents in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nearly two-
thirds of these respondents were war victims, compared to less than one-fourth in
Croatia, one-eighth in Macedonia and only one person in Slovenia. Similar patterns
were found for victims of exclusion, although at a higher level. Individuals living in
Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced the most victimization, with three-fourths of
the sample stating that they experienced at least one exclusion event. The rate was
also high in Croatia and Macedonia, with more than half and more than one-third of
the sample affected, respectively. Individuals in Slovenia were less affected,
although one-quarter reported having been victims of exclusion. The percentage of
people who were victims in each context, of war and/or exclusion, was 88.7% for
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 58.2% for Croatia, 45.0% for the Republic of Macedonia,
and 24.8% for Slovenia.
The positive correlations between war and exclusion victims in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Croatia (Table 2) are due to the fact that 87% of war victims were
also victims of exclusion. On the other hand, 42% of exclusion victims were not
victims of war. There is no such correlation in the two other samples.
Context, Victimization and Belief in a Just World1
The first analysis focused on possible variations in endorsing the belief in a just
world depending on the context in which the individual resided (Hypothesis 1), and
in light of victimization experiences that he/she experienced (Hypothesis 2). We
conducted a hierarchical multiple regression analysis on the total sample with the
belief in a just world as the dependent variable. The analysis was done stepwise,
with each new step embedded into the next step. At the first step, individuals’
country of residence was entered as a dummy variable. Slovenia was the reference
group because of its relatively better situation. Indicators for the other three
countries were thus interpreted in comparison with Slovenia. Victimization
1 For all of the following analyses, the effects of age and gender were tested. Given that there was no
statistically significant effect of age on the belief in a just world and only a marginal effect of sex in
Croatia (women believed more than men), which did not alter the remaining results, these variables were
not included in the reported analyses.
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variables were entered at further steps: victim of exclusion at Step 2 and war victim
at Step 3. All possible interaction effects between victimization variables and each
country were tested, and only those interactions that were statistically significant at
one step were reported and entered into the next step.
As shown in Table 3, at Step 1, the mean level of adherence to the belief in a just
world differed significantly in each country compared to Slovenia. The adherence in
Croatia was higher; it was lower in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and lowest in
Macedonia. At Step 2, the victim of exclusion variable was introduced and
interaction effects with countries that were found to be significant were reported. By
including these variables, the model improved (DF = 3.51, p \ .05). Two
interaction terms were significant. When countries levels were taken into account,
victimization due to exclusion was significant only in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Macedonia. Victims of exclusion were less likely to endorse the idea that the world
is a just place only in the countries where the socioeconomic situation was the
worst. At the third step, the variable war victim was added, as well as the only
significant interaction effect, which significantly improved the model (DF = 3.09,
p \ .05). The results showed that being a war victim diminished the belief in a just
world’s endorsement only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the rates of victims of
war were the highest compared to the other three countries. Furthermore, in this
context, the effect of being a war victim was more important for the decline of belief
in a just world than being a victim of exclusion, as the interaction term between
Table 2 Means, standard deviations, and correlations of belief in a just world (BJW) with victimization
variables across countries
M SD 1 2 3
BiH (n = 140)
1. BJW 3.63 1.44 – -0.15 -0.22*
2. Exclusion victim 0.81 0.40 – 0.27**
3. War victim 0.66 0.47 –
Croatia (n = 141)
1. BJW 4.28 1.19 – 0.05 0.04
2. Exclusion victim 0.54 0.50 – 0.32**
3. War victim 0.24 0.43 –
FYROM (n = 148)
1. BJW 3.08 1.37 – -0.19* 0.01
2. Exclusion victim 0.38 0.49 – 0.03
3. War victim 0.13 0.34 –
Slovenia (n = 149)
1. BJW 3.96 1.05 – 0.04 -0.01
2. Exclusion victim 0.25 0.43 – 0.14
3. War victim 0.01 0.08 –
Note: BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina; FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Victimization
variables are coded as 0 = non victim, 1 = victim
 p \ .10; * p \ .05; ** p \ .01
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Bosnia and Herzegovina and exclusion victim became non-significant at the third
step. Once the victimization variables and interactions were taken into account,
differences between Slovenia and Croatia and between Slovenia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina were non-significant. The fact that war victims were less likely to
believe in a just world in Bosnia and Herzegovina explained the average difference
with Slovenia. However, in the Republic of Macedonia, the variable exclusion
victim partially explained the lower level of adherence to the belief in a just world
compared to Slovenia.
We partially verified our first hypothesis (social anchoring). The level of belief in
a just world in Slovenia and Croatia was higher than that in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the Republic of Macedonia. Yet, the level in Macedonia was even lower and the
variables considered were not sufficient to explain this effect. The second
hypothesis (personal experiences) was validated, but only in contexts with a less
favorable socioeconomic situation; personally victimized individuals adhered less to
the idea of living in a just world than non-victims. This observation concerned war
victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina (two-thirds of the country’s sample) and the
victims of exclusion in the Republic of Macedonia (one-third of the country’s
sample) and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (four-fifths of the sample).
Accumulation of Negative Events and Temporal Effects
Next, we examined whether there was a negative accumulation effect operation-
alized as a weaker level of belief in a just world when victimization episodes were
more numerous (Hypothesis 3). Second, following the idea that the belief system of
traumatized persons can be restored with time, we investigated whether individuals’
endorsement of belief in a just world was greater if the negative episode was farther
in time (Hypothesis 4). The analyses focused on the sub-sample of victims whose
support of the belief in a just world was previously shown to be lower than that of
their non-victims counterparts (i.e., victims of exclusion in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(n = 100) and in the Republic of Macedonia (n = 55) as well as war victims in
Bosnia and Herzegovina (n = 82)).
The number of exclusion events experienced by the sub-sample of victims
was significantly higher in Bosnia and Herzegovina than in Macedonia, F (1,
153) = 18.73, p \ .001 (see Table 4). The temporal distance since the first
exclusion event ranged from 1.25 to 20.25 years prior to the interview. This distance
was widely distributed across time in Macedonia, whereas it was more stricken in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where three-quarters of the first exclusion events occurred
during the war period between 1992 and 1995. Temporal distance since the first war
victimization in Bosnia and Herzegovina varied from 4.75 to 16.75 years; however,
90% occurred during the war period.
Similar to the first analyses, hierarchical multiple regressions on the sub-sample
of exclusion victims of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia were run, with the
belief in a just world as the dependent variable. At the first step, individuals’ country
of residence was controlled for by entering Bosnia and Herzegovina as a dummy
variable. Macedonia was the reference group. Unsurprisingly, the mean score on the
belief in a just world scale for victims of exclusion was higher in Bosnia and
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Herzegovina than in Macedonia (see Table 5). At step 2, the number of negative
events experienced by the person was introduced together with the temporal
distance to the first negative experience. The addition of these variables improved
the model (DF = 5.27; p \ .01). The more often a person experienced negative
events, the lower his/her belief in a just world. At the same time, the more remote
the first event was in time, the stronger was one’s support for the belief in a just
world. In other words, the more recent the event was, the weaker was one’s support
Table 4 Means, standard deviations, and correlations of belief in a just world (BJW) with accumulation
and temporal indicators for victim sub-samples in BiH and FYROM
M SD 1 2 3
Exclusion victims
BiH (n = 100)
1. BJW 3.54 1.52 – -0.11 0.15
2. Number of events 2.35 1.43 – 0.18
3. Temporal distance 11.45 2.95 –
FYROM (n = 55)
1. BJW 2.79 1.28 – -0.29* 0.28*
2. Number of events 1.45 0.74 – -0.01
3. Temporal distance 10.76 5.65 –
War victims
BiH (n = 82)
1. BJW 3.57 1.41 – 0.00 0.09
2. Number of events 2.04 1.01 – 0.15
3. Temporal distance 10.82 1.71 –
Note: BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina; FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Number of events
is number of exclusion events for exclusion victims and number of war events for war victims. Temporal
distance is the number of years past from the first exclusion or the first war victimization event until
December 2004 (date of interview)
 p \ .10; * p \ .05
Table 5 Hierarchical regression analysis predicting support for the belief in a just world for exclusion
victims in BiH and Macedonia
Variables Step 1 Step 2
B SD b B SD b
BiH 0.75 0.24 0.24** 0.87 0.25 0.28***
Number of exclusion events -0.19 0.09 -0.17*
Temporal distance (years) 0.07 0.03 0.21**
R2 0.06 0.12
F 9.63** 6.90***
Note: BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina. BiH is a dummy variable coded as 0 = not living in BiH, 1 = living
in BiH. Macedonia is the reference group
* p \ .05; ** p \ .01; *** p \ .001
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for the belief. In more concrete terms, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia,
victims of exclusion were less likely to believe in a just world than were non-
victims. When controlling for country levels, for each additional year after the first
victimization event, the belief in a just world scored 0.07 higher. Meanwhile, for
each new exclusion event, the belief scored 0.19 lower.
In the sub-sample of war victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the correlation
matrix (Table 4) indicates no significant link between the number of war events and
the belief in a just world. Because the dates for the first war victimization in Bosnia
and Herzegovina were similar across individuals, the temporal distance at the first
victimization event due to war was not tested.
To summarize these results, we did not find a negative cumulative effect of war
experiences on the belief in a just world for war victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
However, we observed a cumulative negative effect for victims of exclusion in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia when we control for the
temporal distance to the first victimization. Moreover, in this last situation, the more
remote was this first negative event, the stronger was one’s belief. Thus, the third
(cumulative effect) and fourth hypotheses (time) were validated for victims of
exclusion in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia, but not for
war victims.
Discussion
We compared the belief in a just world among young adults living in four countries
in the former Yugoslavia: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Republic of Macedo-
nia, and Slovenia. Contrary to conceptualizing the belief in a just world as a stable
concept through time and situations (Dalbert, 2001), we have made the assumption
that, in situations of strong victimization, the general belief in a just world—in the
manner of fundamental or basic beliefs (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Epstein, 1973)—is
shaken and thus decreases. Victimization was considered on two levels: the
contextual level, by considering the negative consequences of recent conflicts and
current socioeconomic status, and the individual level, with interest for victimiza-
tion episodes a person faced.
The results showed, on the one hand, contextual differences in the belief in a just
world, and, on the other hand, a negative effect of victimization experiences.
However, this effect depends on the context in which the individual has been living.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, victims of exclusion are less likely to
believe in a just world than non-victims, but this difference is not found for victims
of Croatia or Slovenia. This diminution effect is only found in the two contexts in
which the socioeconomic situation was the most unfavorable at the time of data
collection. The war victims adhere less strongly to the idea that the world is just
than non-victims, but this effect is only observed in the context of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, in which nearly two-thirds of the sample was hit by a war trauma
(whereas this is the case for less than one-quarter of the Croatian sample, one-eighth
in the Republic of Macedonia and practically no one in Slovenia). Being a victim of
war supplants the effect of being a victim of exclusion in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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These victimization variables, at an individual level, partially explain why the level
of belief in a just world is lower in the Republic of Macedonia than in Croatia, and
Slovenia. These variables entirely explain why the level of belief is lower in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Other variables must therefore be invoked to explain why the
respondents of the Macedonia sub-sample are less likely to subscribe to the idea that
the world is just than those in other contexts. The explanation for this difference
may be found at a societal level by the deleterious socioeconomic situation or by the
short time that had passed since the conflicts (in 2001). These results allow us to
consider that the belief in a just world’s endorsement may vary across situations.
We found a negative effect of cumulative negative events, in line with the results
reported by Cubela Adoric (2004) and Catlin and Epstein (1992). Indeed, for the
victims of exclusion in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Macedonia, the more
negative events that individuals were personally confronted with, the lower the level
of their belief in a just world. However, this negative accumulation was not
observed for victimization due to war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A positive effect
linked to time was underlined for victims of exclusion in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Macedonia. Victims whose first negative event was far away in time showed
stronger support for the belief in a just world than those for which the event was
more recent. These results are in line with Janoff-Bulman’s model (1992): The
belief a person has ‘that the world is just’ is shaken when this person is victimized
because reality contradicts this belief. Thus, the victim integrates this traumatic
event into his/her assumptive world. The belief that the world is a just place will be
restored over time, or will decline if one experiences additional negative events.
The impact of victimization on the belief in a just world is also dependent on the
context in which the individual is inserted. When victimization is experienced on an
individual basis, it may be possible to adopt coping strategies to preserve the belief in
a just world. By contrast, when experiences are widely shared in a societal context, the
belief in a just world may be shattered at a societal level (Ferguson, 2000).
In fact, our results indicate that it is difficult to continue believing in a just world
if society as a whole appears unjust. At first sight, this conclusion may be at odds
with the meta-analysis of Malahy et al. (2009), who showed that increases in
injustice due to income disparities were correlated with higher levels of belief in a
just world. However, essential differences exist between the studies taken into
consideration in this meta-analysis and the current study. The meta-analysis
included US undergraduate students, a rather different sample from the random
sample of young adults aged between 30 and 36 years old used here. Moreover, the
contexts are fundamentally different. First, the socioeconomic level of the USA,
with an HDI of 948 in 2004 (8th rank worldwide), is much higher than those of
countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina or Macedonia. Another main difference
is that the current study did not deal with observers of victimizations, but with actual
victims. The events that they were subjected to at the collective level and those that
they personally experienced were due to fratricidal conflicts or severe economic
precariousness. These high levels of collective vulnerability create a qualitatively
different context than that which can be observed in studies run in the USA or
comparable countries with victims or observers of victims. The challenge of
maintaining core beliefs likely varies in such different contexts. There may be a
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threshold at which the strategies to maintain or restore the belief in a just world are
no longer effective due to obvious massive injustice and collective vulnerability.
Our study suggests that a necessary condition for undermining the belief in a just
world is that individuals share a common fate (Rabbie, 1998).
Subsequently, belief restoration in the aftermath of war would not only depend
on individual coping processes but also on collective processes taking place in
specific social contexts. Indeed, if the belief in a just world is built in the early years
of life by confrontation with the environment (Lerner, 1977), reconstruction of this
belief is likely to occur similarly. When the daily landscape presents a context in
which everyone can rebuild a ‘‘normal’’ life, believing in a just world is again
possible, which is not the case in a context that fails to heal its wounds. It is thus
conceivable that adherence to the belief in a just world in Croatia was lower after
the bloody events of the early 1990s. However, in this context, in which the GDP
and the HDI are now superior to those of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Macedonia, the
process of restoring the beliefs in a just world may have occurred faster. Of course,
only longitudinal data would allow verifying this hypothesis; we cannot rule out that
Croatian residents’ levels of belief in a just world remained stable despite the
traumatic experiences that this country endured. What is impressive is that we
observe a direct relationship between past war victimization and low levels of belief
in a just world in Bosnia and Herzegovina even nine years after the war.
Taken altogether, these results indicate that belief in a just world may vary over
time and across situations. It would be interesting to extend the scope of this
investigation to other countries that have endured high levels of victimization and to
establish more precise contextual indicators for the background where people live. It
would also be necessary to take into account other variables at the individual level,
such as socioeconomic status indicators and group affiliations (ethnic, religious).
Conclusion
In conclusion, we tested the limits of stability and the resistance of the fundamental
belief in a just world (Lerner, 1965). Numerous experiences of victimization, such
as political or socioeconomic exclusion or war trauma, when widely shared in a
societal context, can threaten the belief in a just world by making it decrease at
societal and individual levels. This may occur because reality comes into opposition
with this belief and it becomes unsustainable to continue defending the idea that the
world is just. In addition, the accumulation of negative experiences leads to an
additional decline in the belief in a just world. The belief, however, may be restored
over time. This process, including the time required, depends not only on individual
coping mechanisms, but also on the context in which the individual faces and
experiences the event, and as a consequence depends on agents of societal order that
participate in its reconstruction. Defined as a fundamental delusion, Lerner (1980)
argues that believing in a just world is essential for people’s sense of sanity. Thus, it
is necessary after a war-torn period to offer people a chance to reconstruct the
landscape where they live, in order to restore the healthy feeling that the world is a
place of justice.
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